Over the last ten years, antitrust rules governing vertical agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EC, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation 2790/99, applicable to all sectors of the economy. In addition, changes introduced to the procedural rules have led to the decentralization of Article 81(3) and the removal of the notification requirement. In like manner, in the US, the Supreme Court has gradually taken vertical restraints out of the per se illegality rule. What Sylvania achieved in placing non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason in the late 1970s, the Khan judgment did for maximum resale price maintenance in 1997, while, most recently and most significantly in 2007, the Leegin case followed suit for minimum resale price maintenance. This book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter considers the 'double nature' of vertical agreements and the regulatory dilemma. The second chapter explores the most influential econoOver the last ten years, antitrust rules governing vertical agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EC, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation 2790/99, applicable to all sectors of the economy. In addition, changes introduced to the procedural rules have led to the decentralization of Article 81(3) and the removal of the notification requirement. In like manner, in the US, the Supreme Court has gradually taken vertical restraints out of the per se illegality rule. What Sylvania achieved in placing non-price vertical restraints under the rule of reason in the late 1970s, the Khan judgment did for maximum resale price maintenance in 1997, while, most recently and most significantly in 2007, the Leegin case followed suit for minimum resale price maintenance. This book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter considers the 'double nature' of vertical agreements and the regulatory dilemma. The second chapter explores the most influential econo